Securitization in the USA – Realities and issues (2007-2010)

All of these analyzes show that the base of mortgages used as a basis for the trituration collapsed due to the contraction of household mortgage loans.

The crisis affecting the borrowing and repayment capacities of households has passed through this. Only apartment purchases have held up well. The commercial real estate is not in a position to provide the basis for a strong securitization, but it has successfully resisted the crisis despite the glaring difficulties of US SMEs (Non-Corporate Business).

It must be emphasized that the preservation of significant securitization in the US is done by GSEs, with Ginnie Mae bearing the brunt of the burden. Ginnie Mae’s cautious securitization, which is based on criteria of debt homogeneity (Ginnie Mae I RMBS) and rational geographical dispersion (Ginnie Mae II RMBS), is a major factor.

On the other hand, private trituration continues to experience a general contraction except for the securitization of commercial private ABS, which is lower than the overall securitization with household debt.

It is, therefore, the household sector that penalizes the securitization of which it is the heart. For the traditionally deficit-based coverage of the US balance of payments, this crisis in private and public ABS leads to a deficit in coverage that appears to be undergoing a slight correction.

This correction should be much stronger for Treasury bills to no longer insure, as it has since 2008, the bulk of net portfolio investments that protect the value of the dollar. At a time when foreign investors are beginning to distrust US sovereign debt, the resumption of securitization flows between the US and the world will be critical to ensuring the sustainability of the $.

Securitization does not stop there. Through the trituration of mortgage loans and consumer credit, the US is also succeeding in exporting a fraction of household debt and, to a lesser extent, US companies via the securitization of the commercial real estate. This export makes it possible, on the one hand, to refinance the balance of payments and on the other hand to bring in savings that American households accumulate only very slightly.

In the case of securitization, this savings really plays the role of substituted savings providing coverage for US savings needs.

Thus the overconsumption of households and their purchases of real estate lead to the entry into the US fresh money that is lacking a society eaten by national overconsumption and over-indebtedness.

This substituted foreign savings finally allows the US to cover their national investments by consuming more than measurement, but it is also used to value the financial assets of the US market. The mechanism of securitization is therefore inseparable from the valuation of US real estate and financial assets under the action of the fictitious swelling of the entire value of real estate and financial assets that requires fresh savings contributions in sufficient quantities.

It is therefore essential that public and private securitization resume fairly quickly on a large scale. The uncertainties of the recovery (which we no longer believe), the role assigned to the GSE by the FED-Trésor couple, the general contraction of credit make the scenario of a resumption of large-scale titration quite illusory. The data we examined show that most of the restart of the trituration is due to a GSE supported by the FED (which bought Ginnie Mae securitized assets) and by the Treasury which guarantees the entire securitization. GSE Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Fannie Mae.

It seems that most of the resumption of securitization is taking place in the shadow of credit and public guarantees.

Also, the weak progress of the private securitization could only be the expression of an official securitization detracting from the private securitization without really stimulating it.

We have investigated the US securitization case, we have noted a progress of private securitization in US and foreign net transactions, we are not convinced that this improvement is anything but a mild effect. public policies to stimulate the economy. The resumption of private securitization would then be a by-product of public property support policies orchestrated by the FED and the Treasury, this recovery would be done in the shadow of the public credit. The return of securitization would go hand in hand with the growth of a GDP artificially supported by fiscal deficits.

At a time when US real estate is being abandoned to the market in an America suffering mass and long-term unemployment, one may wonder whether the return to grace of securitization with foreign and US investors is not an open parenthesis. the public policies of the FED and the Treasury. If GSE’s triturating products have been bought again by the US and foreign investors, is it not because of the existence of a “syndicate of buying” securitization products around a couple FED-Trésor, a union formed through the zeroing of credit risk on securitized GSE receivables whose balance sheet and issued securities are ultimately placed under the protection of the Treasury.